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Parker v. Levy-Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and a Gentleman
INTRODUCTION
In June, 1974 the United States Supreme Court in Parker v. Levy'
reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, thereby
affirming the military court-martial and the district court, by
holding that Articles 1332 and 1343, the "General Articles", of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) 4, were not unconstitu-
tionally vague nor were they invalid for overbreadth. By so ruling,
the majority of the court chose to ignore the vast amount of
scholarly criticism recently gathered against the Articles, and
instead followed a long list of precedents 6 giving little consideration
to the vastly changed historical context.
First enacted in this country by the Second Continental Congress
1. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
2. 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970) providing: "Any commissioned officer, cadet,
or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."
3. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970) providing: "Though not specifically men-
tioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of
which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cogni-
zance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial according to the
nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion
of that court."
4. 10 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq. (1970).
5. Avrech v. Secretary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Note, Taps for the Real Catch-22, 81 YALE L.J. 1518 (1972); Everett,
Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice-A Study in Vagueness,
37 N. CAR. L.R. 142 (1959); Comment, The General Article is Unconsti-
tutionally Vague and Overbroad, 18 ST. Louis U. L. J. 150 (1973); Comment,
The Discredit Clause of the U.C.M.J.: An Unrestricted Anachronism, 18
U.C.L.A. L.R. 821 (1971); Hodson, Perspective: The Manual for Courts-
Martial-1984, 57 MIL. L.R. 1 (1972).
6. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 Howe) 65 (1857); Smith v. Whitney,
116 U.S. 167 (1886); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890); United States v.
Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84 (1893); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897);
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); United States v. Frantz, 2 U.S.C.M.A.
161, 7 C.M.R. 37 (1953); United States v. Sadinsky, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 34
C.M.R. 343 (1964).
on June 30, 17757 Articles 133 and 134 were derived from the British
Articles of War s , which trace their antecedents from the Articles
of War of James II, in 16889. Enacted in the American Articles
of War of 1806, the original phrase "scandalous, infamous" was
omitted and in its place was substituted "any commissioned officer
convicted before a general court-martial of conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman, shall be dismissed from the service." The
articles have thus remained unchanged since 1806.10
FACTS
Howard Levy, a physician, was a Captain in the Army assigned
as Chief of the Dermatological Service of the United States Army
Hospital at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. On June 2, 1967, Captain
Levy was convicted by a general court-martial of violations of
Articles 90,11 133, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman
and 134, conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces, of the U.C.M.J., and sentenced to dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement at hard labor
for three years.
As Chief of the Dermatological Service, it was Captain Levy's
duty to train Special Forces (Green Beret) aid men who would be
serving in Vietnam. He refused to conduct such training, viewing
it as contrary to his medical ethics, and refused to obey a written
order to commence such training. The charges and specifications
under which Captain Levy was charged included promoting dis-
affection among the troops by urging black servicemen, because
they were discriminated against in this country, not to go to Viet-
nam, and by saying that Special Forces personnel were liars who
killed innocent women and children.' 2  After exhausting his
military and civilian avenues of appeal, 1 3 Captain Levy sought
7. W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 2d ed. at 953 (1920).
8. Id. at. 929, 931.
9. Id. at 920.
10. Id. at 976.
11. 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1970) providing: "Any person subject to this chap-
ter who . . . (2) willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior com-
missioned officer; ... shall be punished. . . as a court-martial may direct."
12. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 739 (1974). For complete charges and
specifications see United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672, 674-75 (1968).
13. United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672 (1968), pet. for rev. den., 18
U.S.C.M.A. 627 (1969); Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
appl. for stay den., 387 U.S. 915 (1969), cert. den., 389 U.S. 960 (1967); Levy
v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967), aff'd per curiam, 384 F.2d
689 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. den., 389 U.S. 1049 (1968); Levy v. Dillon, 286
F. Supp. 593 (D.C. Kan. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1969).
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federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court,14
which held that the various articles were not unconstitutional. The
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Articles 133 and
134 were void for vagueness. 5
CIRCUIT COURT OPINION
In examining the articles, the Court of Appeals found that, within
the Military Court System, Article 133 had withstood a constitu-
tional attack predicated upon the First Amendment1 6 while Article
134 had met challenges for vagueness in United States v. Frantz7
and United States v. Sadinsky.18 The cases rested their conclusions
upon Dynes v. Hoover and the list of precedents which followed."'
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded, "that Article 134 weathered
the challenge of vagueness in the Supreme Court in 1858 for sub-
stantially the same reasons adopted by the Court of Military
Appeals in 1953 in Frantz.20 Viewing the vastly changed historical
circumstances, the Court of Appeals reconsidered the articles under
the premise that in order to accomodate changed circumstances con-
cepts of justice change and that stare decisis must bow to changing
values.
2 1
The Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court dissenting opinion,
only alluded to what vastly changed historical changes had oc-
curred. Similarly, the cases and authorities supporting the consti-
tutionality of the articles, based on the military custom and usage,
are equally as vague.
It appears that much of the support for the articles is based upon
the English and European military systems of the eighteenth and
14. Levy v. Parker, 316 F. Supp. 473 (M.D. Penn. 1970).
15. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973).
16. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
17. 2 U.S.C.M.A. 161, 7 C.M.R. 37 (1953). In fact the court gave the
matter little attention, saying, ". . . to put the question is to answer it in
all reasonable minds." 2 U.S.C.M.A. at 163, 7 C.M.R. at 39.
18. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 34 C.M.R. 343 (1964). In Avrech v. Secretary of
the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1973), Justice Clark found Article 134
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under the Fifth Amendment.
19. Supra note 6.
20. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1973).
21. Id. at 787, 788, citing concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 304, 329-30 (1972).
ninteenth centuries-systems whose officers were gentlemen drawn
from the ruling aristocracy. The military recruits came from
societies accustomed to giving blind obedience to Kings. In con-
trast, the army of the Viet Nam era was predominantly made up
of draftees content only on doing their minimum time and re-
turning to civilian life in one piece. These draftees, like Dr. Levy,
came from a society becoming ever more wary of our longest war.
Today's army has abandoned many of the time honored traditions
upon which military custom and usage was based. We no longer
have an army segregated by color or sex. The traditional barracks
has been replaced by modern college type dormitories while women
are entering such previously closed assignments as aviation. Beer
is being served in the mess hall while civilians do the K.P.! And
how much custom and tradition is left when massive Madison
Avenue campaigns are launched to convince young men and women
that "The Army Wants to Join You" or that the Marine Corps
"Never Promised You a Rose Garden"? Apparently, with these
facts in mind, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was time for
change.
The Court of Appeals found that both articles were unconstitu-
tionally void for vagueness, failing to meet the previously estab-
lished standards of constitutionality set forth in numerous cases
which require that a law must be clear enough so that persons of
common understanding would know what was forbidden.22
[tihe history of prosecutions under this article show that it has
served as an unwritten criminal code, a catchall receptacle . . . at
best the Manual includes but a compliation of those offenses pre-
viously determined by various courts-martial to come within the
breadth of Article 134 . . . the boundless, open-ended, all encom-
passing quality of this article runs counter to the basic philosophy
of criminal codes of all modern nations . . . these articles also have
the very real capacity for artibrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment.28
22. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), anti-picketing or-
dinance; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), vagrancy;
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), three or more people annoying
to others; Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (l66), jury costs assessed
to an innocent defendant upon finding of some misconduct; Gelling v.
Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952), prejudicial to the best interests of the people
of the city; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939): "No one may
be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the mean-
ing of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids . . . 'And a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, vio-
lates the first essential of due process of law.'"
23. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, at 790-92. See also Avrech v. Secre-
tary of the Navy, 477 F.2d 1237, at 1241-2.
[VOL. 2: 435, 1975] Parker v. Levy
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The Court of Appeals did not find it necessary to determine
whether the exact conduct of Captain Levy was unbecoming or dis-
crediting as defined by the Manual for Courts-Martial.24 Since the
wording of Articles 133 and 134 makes it possible to charge others
without giving them sufficient warning that their conduct was pro-
hibited, the articles were therefore found to be void for vagueness
on their face.25
SUPREME COURT DECISION
Justice Rehnquist joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justices Black-
man, White and Powell, delivered the opinion for the majority,
which was primarily based upon the judicial precedents upholding.
the articles. The majority viewed the military as a specialized
society, separate and distinct from civilian society; and thus with
a separate and distinct justice system based upon military customs
and traditions. 20 Since the unwritten law based on custom and
usage gave sufficient meaning to the articles, it was immaterial
whether Captain Levy had warning that his specific conduct might
be punishable under the code; instead, the Court relied upon the
cases of United States v. Fletcher27 and Swaim v. United States. 28
24. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (1969) promulgated by executive or-
der.
25. Citing the Court in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, at 616
(1971): "We need not lament that we do not have before us the details
of the conduct found to be annoying. It is the ordinance on its face that
sets the standard of conduct and warns against transgression. The details
of the offense could no more serve to validate this ordinance than could
the details of the offense charged under an ordinance suspending uncondi-
tionally the right of assembly and free speech."
26. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953): "[t]he military consti-
tutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that
of the civilian." 'Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953): "[M]ilitary
law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from
the law which governs our federal judicial establishment." Dynes v.
Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 Howe) 65, 79 (1857): "[a]ll crimes committed by per-
sons belonging to the navy, which are not specified in the foregoing articles,
shall be punished according to the laws and customs in such cases at sea."
Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 179 (1886); "Now this procedure is founded
upon the usages and customs of war ... the general usage of the military
service, or what may not unfittingly be called the customary military law."
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 537, 542 (1827): ". . . according to
the general usage of military service or what may not unfitly be called the
customary military law."
27. 148 U.S. 84 (1893).
28. 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
In Fletcher, the Supreme Court affirmed a Court of Claims decision
which had found
In military life there is a higher code termed honor, which holds
its society to stricter accountability, and it is not desirable that the
standard of the Army shall come down to the requirements of a
criminal code.29
In order to justify the lack of definition in determining punishable
behavior, the Court of Claims in Swaim relied on a similar nebulous
standard, saying:
The Articles of War do not define either of these offenses, nor can
a court of law. What is conduct unbecoming an officer and gentle-
man, or what is conduct to the prejudice of good order and mili-
tary discipline is beyond the bounds of exact formula, and must
depend more or less upon the circumstances and peculiarities of
each case ... must be guaged by an actual knowledge and experi-
ence of military life, its usages and duties.80
In addition, Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, found un-
written military law consists of "certain established principles and
usages peculiar or pertaining to the military status and service
). "31 Due to the differences between civilian and military law
it is impossible to equate the U.C.M.J. to a civilian criminal code,
the military being ". . . the executive arm. Its law is that of obedi-
ence."'32 It therefore follows that the U.C.M.J. can and does impose
sanctions for conduct not punishable by civilian criminal codes.33
Relying on Frantz, the majority in Levy viewed Article 134
... not in vacuo, but in the context in which the years have placed
it. . . Accordingly, we conclude that the article establishes a stan-
dard 'well enough known to enable those within ... (its) reach
to correctly apply them.' "34
Further illumination is supposedly gleamed from the Manual for
Courts-Martial, which restricts the limitation of Article 134 to
"certain disloyal statements by military personnel,"3 5 and decisions
holding that the conduct must be "directly and palpably as dis-
tinguished from indirectly and remotely prejudical to good order
and discipline. ' 36 Since Captain Levy's conduct was clearly pro-
29. Fletcher v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 541, 563 (1891).
30. Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. C1. 173, 228-9 (1893).
31. W. WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 41.
32. In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890).
33. 10 U.S.C. 889 (1970), disrespect toward superior commissioned offi-
cer; 10 U.S.C. 893 (1970), cruelty towards, or oppression or maltreatment
of subordinates; 10 U.S.C. 912 (1970), drunkenness on duty; 10 U.S.C. 915
(1970), malingering.
34. 2 U.S.C.M.A. at 163,.7 C.M.R. at 39.
35. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 24, at P213c, 28-77.
36. United States v. Sadinsky, 14 U.S.C.MLA. 563 at 565, 34 C.M.R. 343
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hibited, the Court presumed that he did not have standing to
challenge the articles for vagueness merely because they might be
applied in the future to another without warning.37 It appears that
the contention of the court was not that the military was exempted
from the proscriptions of due process, but that military life
peculiarly provides notice, through custom and usage, of the stand-
ard of behavior required.
The need for obedience and discipline, coupled with the many
factors differentiating military society from civilian society makes
the requirement of notice less then that for civilian criminal codes,
the ". . . proper standard of review for a vagueness challenge to
the articles of the Code (U.C.M.J.) is the standard which applies
to criminal statutes regulating economic affairs. 38
DissENT
Mr. Justice Stewart wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Douglas3 9
and Brennan (Justice Marshall taking no part in the decision),
echoing the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals. Finding the
wording of Articles 133 and 134 almost identical to the wording
of civilian statutes which the court had previously invalidated,40
Justice Stewart declared the articles vague on their face and not
sufficiently narrowed by judicial construction to be saved from
unconstitutionality. The majority, though, felt the sample form
specifications, provided in the back of the Manual, for various
offenses under the articles established sufficient meaning and suf-
ficient narrowing to give the unwary notice of what conduct was
prohibited. Rather than narrowing the construction, the number
of form specifications provided for Article 134 has been constantly
expanding from 47 in 1953,41 58 in 1967,42 to 63 in 1969,43 and these
at 345 (1964); United States v. Holiday, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 454, 456, 16 C.M.R.
28, 30 (1954).
37. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 756: "One to whose conduct a statute
clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness."
38. Id. at 756.
39. Justice Douglas dissented in a separate opinion based on the First
Amendment privilege of free speech.
40. Supra note 22.
41. United States v. Frantz, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 161 at 163, 7 C.M.R. 37 at 39
(1953).
42. Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929 at 933-4 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
43. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 24, A6-20 to A6-26, at 126-
188.
form specifications are not intended to be exclusive.44 In addition,
Article 133 has been applied to such diverse charges as being found
with an enlisted man's wife in a compromising situation,45 charging
excessive interest to an enlisted man,46 dishonorable failure to pay
debts,47 sale of liquor to an enlisted man at an unconscionable
price, 48 abusing one's wife in public, 49 and cheating at cards.50 The
charges under Article 134 have been equally nefarious, running the
gamut from driving in violation of a civilian court decree,51 indecent
acts with a chicken,52 window peeping,53 and cheating while calling
bingo numbers.5 4 The use of Articles 133 and 134 as open-ended,
catchalls has been the prevailing practice for years, Winthrop
noting that ". . . in practice, the greater number of charges . . .
are based upon this general article of the code." 55 In fact, charges
and convictions leave little doubt that "an infinite variety of other
conduct, limited only by the scope of a commander's creativity or
spleen, can be made the subject of court-martial under these
articles." 0
Even if these decisions were valid in the past, the army into which
Dr. Levy entered as a physician under the "Berry Plan '57 was vastly
different than the small voluntary, professional cadre of soldiers,
most of whom had career in mind and could be said to know what
was expected of them, existing prior to World War II. Therefore,
Justice Stewart concluded that the circumstances should be viewed
as
44. United States v. Fisher, 6 C.M.R. 195 (1952); United States v. Holt,
7 U.S.C.M.A. 617, 621, 23 C.M.R. 81, 85 (1957).
45. United States v. Lee, 4 C.M.R. 185 (1951).
46. United States v. Giordano, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 163, 35 C.M.R. 135 (1964).
47. United States v. Journell, 18 C.M.R. 752 (1954).
48. United States v. Kupfer, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 478, 9 C.M.R. 283 (1952).
49. United States v. Downard, 1 C.M.R. 405 (1951).
50. United States v. West, 16 C.M.R. 587 (1954).
51. United States v. Bonar, 40 C.M.R. 587 (1954).
52. United States v. Sanchez, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 216, 29 C.M.R. 32 (1960).
53. United States v. Clark, 22 C.M.R. 888 (1957).
54. United States v. Holt, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 617, 23 C.M.R. 81 (1957).
55. W. WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 720.
56. Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 MAINE L. REv. 3,80 (1970). Some of the more interesting and tenuous charges under these
articles have been reversed on appeal: Showing a lewd picture to a friend,
United States v. Ford, 31 C.M.R. 353 (1963); passenger leaving the scene
of an accident, United States v. Waluski, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 724, 21 C.M.R. 46(1956); failure to prevent female from being raped by another, United
States v. Sloan, 14 C.M.R. 375 (1954); presenting an undisciplined appear-
ance by shaving in the afternoon and by complaining to a superior officer,
United States v. Wolfson, 36 C.M.R. 722 (1965).
57. 50 U.S.C.A. 454 (1970), agreement to serve two years if first allowed
to complete medical studies.
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manifestly a vastly 'altered historic environment' . . to pre-
sume that he and others like him who served during the Vietnam
era were so imbued with the ancient traditions of the military as
to comprehand the arcane meaning of the General Articles is to
engage in an act of judicial fantasy . . . the Dynes case and its
progeny have become constitutional anachronisms, and I would
retire them from service . . . We deal here with criminal statutes.
And I cannot believe that such meaningless statutes as these can
be used to send men to prison under a Constitution that guarantees
due process of law.58
CONCLUSION
In spite of the dissenting opinions and the mounting criticism of
Articles 133 and 134, it is apparent from the judicial precedents and
the shift to an all volunteer military, consisting of a small cadre
of professional military men who know what is expected of them
by a so-called higher standard of character and conduct, that the
articles will not presently be subject to constitutional attack. The
alternative is an attempt, on policy grounds, to convince the
military to accept one of the viable alternatives to Articles 133 and
134, a possible necessity in recruiting the high quality individuals
necessary for an all volunteer army.
There seems little reason for the military to staunchly defend
the use of such nebulous articles, the need for which is indeed
dubious. No less esteemed a critic than the Chief Judge of the
Army Court of Military Review has recommended the abolition of
Article 134;59 and in its place to substitute three classes of offenses
under the other punitive articles. 60 Another possible alternative
would be to draw more definite specifications for offenses now
charged under Articles 133 and 134 as separate articles as is now
done with the other punitive articles. The imagined need to protect
against the "novel offense" would be very limited since most
sources of trouble posing a problem to discipline could be accord-
58. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 781-3, 789 (1974).
59. Hodson, Perspective: The Manual for Courts-Martial-1984, 57 MIL.
L.R. 1, 12 (1972).
60. 10 U.S.C. 892 (1970): "Any person subject to this chapter who ...
(1) Violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation; (2)
having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the
armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or (3)
is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct."
ingly defined and codified. The articles, as they now stand, bring
discredit, through their arbitary application, upon a military justice
system that is otherwise reasonable and workable. One need only
visit an Officer's Club on Friday afternoon to view the possibilities
of arbitrary application for such supposed crimes as drunkenness
or abusing one's wife in public. In fact, high ranking dissenters,
with the exception of General Billy Mitchell, have escaped court-
martial while lower ranking dissenters have met exceedingly harsh
sentences.6 1
Other laws exist under which most, if not all, of the offenses
now being charged under Articles 133 and 134, could be brought.6 2
Under most conditions, discipline could be maintained by admin-
istrative procedures such as reprimand, removal from position, dis-
missal or transfer. 3  Both General Douglas MacArthur and
General Edwin Walker were removed from command and the whole
history of My Lai, with the exception of Lieutenant Calley, shows
the use of administrative sanctions for actions much more repre-
hensible than those cited against Captain Levy. A maximum
sentence of six months for the various charges under the articles
would go a long way to temper the inequities and harshness of
justice now being experienced.
Now is the time for change to bring military justice in line with
civilian standards of criminal conduct before others, like Captain
Levy, will be convicted and sentenced for such nebulous offenses
as conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman and conduct
bringing discredit upon the armed forces.
JAMES M. KAMmAN
61. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967), two
years reduced to one, for contemptuous words against the President; United
States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1971), ten years reduced
to four years for disloyal statements; United States v. Harvey, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
539, 42 C.M.R. 141 (1971), six years reduced to three for disloyal statements;
United States v. Amick and Stolte, 40 C.M.R. 720 (1969), four years each
for distributing anti-war leaflets.
62. The smith' Act, 10 U.S.C. 2387 (1970); the Federal Assimilative
Crime Act, 8 U.S.C. 13 (1970).
63. United States v. Wolfson, 36 C.M.R. 722, 723 (1965): "Article 133
is to be reserved for serious delicts of officers. The article should not be
demeaned by using it to charge minor delinquencies that can be more ap-
propriately handled by instruction, counselling or other types of administra-
tive corrective action."
